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Introduction 
The title of my talk is “Taking empire seriously” and I’ve titled my talk this way because essentially, the 
larger question I want to ponder in my lecture is this: what if we as sociologists do take empire serious-
ly? What would taking empire seriously mean – if anything – for our social theories, our concepts and 
methods, our research generally? My overarching argument will be that, taking empire seriously 
should force us to critique sociology. It should force us to reflect critically on the questions we ask and 
the concepts or theories that we employ. In turn, taking empire seriously means that we will have to 
ask new questions and deploy or perhaps generate new concepts and theories.  
Another way to put my argument is this: taking empire seriously means that we would fare well to 
take postcolonial theory seriously, and that we should think harder about generating what I would call a 
“postcolonial” (or perhaps a “decolonial”) sociology.  
In this talk, I will first address the question of empire. Why talk about empire at all? Aren’t empires 
over? And if they are over, why should we take them seriously? Here, one of my arguments will be that 
taking empire seriously means that we must question sociology’s relationship to empire and hence 
social theory’s epistemic limits. Finally, after addressing these matters I will turn to postcolonial theory. 
On Empire 
Part of the problem with discussing empire today is that, by today, we tend to forget the importance of 
empires for modern history. And as many sociologists know little about history in the first place, em-
pire is even more elusive. But anyone who has read the work of historians, at least since the 1990s 
with the “imperial turn” in history, understands just how important empire has been.  
                                                          
 Portions of this talk have been published in Julian Go, Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory (Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 
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After all, empire has been the dominant sociopolitical formation of modernity. It is the worst kind of 
naïve presentism to assume that nation-states are the natural form for societies. In fact, up until the 
last few decades, the world was organized in terms of empires and colonies. For centuries, societies 
were not bounded as nation-states, but rather as parts of empires. And by the early twentieth-century, 
nine-tenths of the globe had been occupied by imperial powers and their colonies. Nearly every socie-
ty in the world today, therefore, is either a former colony of another society or a former imperial pow-
er. 
Empires were massive social systems that touched everyone. Of course, empires were economic 
systems, predicated upon dispossession, extraction, and various forms of forced labor (not least slav-
ery). But more than just economic systems, empires were also sociopolitical, ideological and cultural 
systems, generating new racial ideologies and all kinds of governmentalities and techniques of rule. 
Furthermore, empires were not just about brute political domination and economic extraction. They 
also generated entire systems of representation and knowledge – an entire culture and episteme of 
empire by which its participants came to view the world. Empire was about knowledge as much as it 
was about economic, political and racial domination. 
Empires were not just things that existed “out there,” somehow separate from modern European 
societies. They were constitutive of European modernity too. It is not only that the industrial wealth of 
Anglo-European societies was made possible through imperial expansion and accumulation overseas; 
it is also the case that other crucial aspects of the “modern” – techniques of value extraction, labor 
control, discipline, policing and surveillance, modern systems of sanitation, health and imprisonment, 
notions of race and ethnicity, and the very idea of the “modern” itself – were initially deployed and 
developed (if not invented) in overseas colonies or through imperial relations. 
My claim is that sociology needs to take empire seriously. If sociology is the so-called “science of 
modernity,” then surely it must incorporate empire, colonialism, and slavery into its accounts, into its 
conceptual arsenal, and into its theories. 
The problem is that sociology has not been very good about understanding empire. Empire and its 
correlates such as colonialism and slavery – have been for too long a blind spot of sociology. Except 
for Marx, none of our classical sociological theories took empire and colonialism seriously. Weber, 
Durkheim, Simmel, and through Parsons and Luhmann – none of them made colonialism a central 
part of their accounts of modernity. And even when early theorists did talk about empire and colonial-
ism, they talked about it in a very specific way: they did so in a way that minimized its importance for 
modernity. When Marx theorized colonialism as a matter of primitive accumulation for instance, he 
saw that as a passing phase, not as something that remained constitutive of western capitalism. When 
S. N. Eisenstadt (1963) wrote his award-winning book on empires in the 1960s, he theorized empires 
as something that happened before modernity or outside of European modernity – not in modernity.  
The Epistemic Implications of Empire 
So, what to do? Well the matter is not as simple as “bringing empire back in.” That is, taking empire 
seriously does not mean only making empire and its correlates an object of analysis where it has been 
ignored before. It cannot just mean using existing sociological tools to study empire and colonialism. 
Why not? Because this attempt to “bring empire back in” would not deal with the epistemic implication 
of taking empire seriously: that is that sociology itself has been disabled if not contaminated by its 
origins in empire. We can’t just understand empire from the standpoint of sociology because, histori-
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cally, disciplinary sociology from its founding has expressed, manifested and reflected the culture, 
habitus and standpoint of empire. It has not critically reflected upon empire. 
What I am speaking of here, more precisely, is the connection between empire and sociology. 
George Steinmetz (2009) among others has been doing some research on sociologists and their insti-
tutional connections with colonial states and imperial projects. In my previous work I have researched 
such connections in the North American case (Go 2013). But I am speaking here today on a different 
level. I am not speaking about the direct institutional connections between sociology and empire but 
rather epistemic connections. And on this point I am actually just relying upon a rudimentary sociology 
of knowledge; precisely the sort of sociology of knowledge advocated by Karl Mannheim when he first 
articulated his sociology of knowledge here at the 6th Congress in Zürich in 1928. “The principal thesis 
of the sociology of knowledge,” Mannheim wrote in Ideology and Utopia, “is that there are modes of 
thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscure” (Mann-
heim 1936, p.2). 
This is not the time to go into Mannheim’s thought in any great detail, but what I take from him is 
the basic point that knowledge is always generated within certain social and historical contexts, and 
that therefore those contexts influence that knowledge. They do not determine it but they influence it 
in all kinds of complex ways.  
And so let us ask: what was the social context in which sociology as a mode of thought and a disci-
pline first emerged? The answer is that it was a context of empires: disciplinary sociology emerged in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, exactly when the European empires and the American empire 
consolidated their control over the globe. And what was the social structure of this imperial world? On 
the one hand, there was an economic, racial and gendered structure within the European metropoles: 
and sociology occupied one place in that structure. As R. W. Connell (2007) points out, disciplinary 
sociology emerged in, of and for the white middle- to upper middle-class males of the imperial 
metropoles. But, on the other hand, sociology also occupied a place in a global structure of empires. 
This was a geopolitical and socioeconomic global hierarchy and the European imperial metropoles 
were at the top. Sociology emerged in this particular context, in this particular place within the larger 
global social hierarchy: at the top. And if we take Mannheim and the sociology of knowledge seriously, 
we have to acknowledge that disciplinary sociology was influenced by this social position. It first 
emerged in the context of empire and, therefore, like all knowledges at the time, it was influenced by 
that context. It was part and parcel of the culture of empire.  
 Remember that the very notion of the “social” – as a space between nature and the spiritual realm 
– first emerged and resonated in the 19th century among European male elites to make sense of and 
to try to manage social upheaval and resistance from workers, women, and from colonized natives. 
Or, remember that in the United States, one of the first books with the word “sociology” in the title was 
published in 1854 by George Fitzhugh. It was called, Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Society 
and it deployed the social concept to vindicate the slave system in the American South. And remember 
that the questions that were asked by sociology in the early 20th century reflected the concerns and 
categories of imperial power. From its concerns over social disorder, to its attachment to Social Dar-
winism, to its focus upon the so-called “Negro problem” in the US or questions of how to assimilate 
immigrants, or early sociology’s promulgation of race theory; to Weber or Durkheim’s Orientalist and 
essentialist lenses for discussing other cultures – in all of these respects and more, sociology reflected 
the questions of interest to imperial centers and promulgated the worldview of those metropoles. It is 
not important, then, that some sociologists supported empire or were employed by colonial states. 
The point is that sociology as an intellectual project was part and parcel of the imperial episteme, ex-
pressing the culture, habitus and standpoint of Europe and America’s imperial metropoles.  
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And so my argument is that taking empire seriously means we have to take sociology’s imperial or-
igins seriously. We have to recognize sociology’s embeddedness within the episteme of empire. And 
this in turn means we can’t just use existing sociological tools to think critically about the world. In-
stead, we need to think harder about the epistemic legacies of empire upon sociology and then con-
sider how we might equip sociology differently. And we must do this not to be politically correct but 
because we want to fulfill sociology’s mission of critically understanding the modern world. 
It is here where postcolonial theory can help. 
Postcolonial Theory 
In discussing postcolonial theory, I am joining sociologists who have already discussed it and its possi-
ble relevance for sociology (e.g. Bhambra 2007; Boatcâ and Costa 2010). Here I offer my own brief 
sketch.  
First, what do I mean by “postcolonial theory”? I think the concept is fraught with confusion, and the 
sociologists I just mentioned probably define it differently. When I speak of ‘postcolonial theory’ or 
‘postcolonial thought’, I am thinking of a body of writing and thought that has come in the form of two 
main waves – at least in the North American context in which I operate. 
The first wave is the body of writing that proliferated in the early to mid-twentieth century amidst 
anticolonial movements around the world. It included thinkers like Franz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Aime 
Cesaire, Albert Memmi, and earlier, C. L. R. James and in the US, W. E. B. DuBois among others (Go 
2016a). The “second wave” is the wave that emerged within the academic humanities in the US starting 
roughly in the 1980s. This is often called “postcolonial studies,” and it includes Homi Bhabha, Edward 
Said, Gayatri Spivak, and in history Dipesh Chakrabarty and subaltern studies; among others (see ibid).  
There are other lineages and traditions that are related or adjacent to what I am calling “postcolo-
nial theory.” For instance, there is a tradition called “Black Marxism” which I think is connected (Robin-
son 2000). There’s also a Latin American tradition of “decolonial thought” from Quijano and more re-
cently with Mignolo and I’d add them to the second wave. But I don’t really want to quibble with these 
labels, because what’s important here is what all of these seemingly diverse thinkers share. They share 
these basic elements: 
(1) unlike traditional sociology, there’s a focus upon empire and its importance in the making of 
modernity,  
(2) a critique of empire, its correlates (like racialization, colonialism and slavery), and its legacies 
and  
(3) an attempt to transcend empire’s legacies, including its epistemic legacies.  
To clarify, there are other intellectual traditions that also take empire seriously and critique it, like 
Marxism, dependency theory and world-systems theory. But I do think postcolonial theory has a dis-
tinct focus. One distinct focus is upon racialization. It was through empire and colonialism that ‘race’ 
was invented, mobilized, and institutionalized; and so postcolonial theory, unlike some other intellec-
tual traditions, sees racialization as central. W. E. B. Dubois’ claim that the problem of the 20th century 
is the “color line” is a good example. Similarly, thinkers like Aimé Césaire or Fanon were members of 
the Communist Party but criticized the Party’s failure – and Marxism’s failure more broadly – to recog-
nize the specificity of racial domination and their insistence on reducing race and colonialism to sec-
ondary importance. As Césaire wrote in his resignation from the Communist Party:  
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… we, men of color … have come to grasp, in our consciousness, the full breadth of 
our singularity … which cannot be confused with any other […] our struggle—the 
struggle of colonial peoples against colonialism, the struggle of peoples of color 
against racism—is more complex, or better yet, of a completely different nature than 
the fight of the French worker against French capitalism, and it cannot in any way be 
considered a part, a fragment, of that struggle (Césaire 2010 [1956]: 147).  
The other thing about postcolonial theory is that it uniquely focuses upon empire’s culture and epis-
teme. That includes racism, of course, but also all of the Eurocentric meaning systems, representa-
tions, ideas and knowledge formations that empire wrought and which persist in various forms today 
– including in the humanities and social sciences. This is seen in the early anticolonial thinkers like 
Fanon and up through the second wave. Key to all of their writings is this notion that empire not only 
involved the spread of capitalism but also cultural and epistemic logics. This I think is why Edward 
Said’s book Orientalism (1979) was so seminal, for it unearthed how epistemic structures representing 
the Orient (as regressive, static, singular) were not epiphenomenal or a sideshow to imperialism, but 
rather facilitated and enabled it in the first place. It showed how entire formations of knowledge 
helped to create this conceptual tool of empire, and also suggested that we still live with these epis-
temic structures whenever we talk about the Orient or “Islam.” Similarly, Fanon criticized how psychia-
try and psychology were part of and reflected the imperial episteme (Fanon [1952]1967; Macey 2000, 
p.223). Subaltern studies have critiqued how history as a mode of knowledge expressed the imperial 
standpoint (Chakrabarty 2002). And so on.  
Finally, while postcolonial theory examines the racial and epistemic aspects of empire, it is not con-
cerned only with the past. From the perspective of postcolonial theory, the political decolonization of 
Asia and Africa in the twentieth century or in other parts of the world was a monumental disappoint-
ment. It did not bring equality between metropolitan and ex-colonial countries; nor did it bring a de-
colonization of consciousness or culture; it did not bring epistemic decolonization. “We live,” says Ga-
yatri Spivak, “in a post-colonial neo-colonized world” (Spivak, Harasym 1990, p.166). This means that 
the culture and episteme of empire persists today; it is a culture and episteme that contributes to and 
helps sustain inequalities between the global South and North; and a culture and episteme that con-
tinues to obfuscate our understanding of the world.  
It is here where the postcolonial project comes to the fore. For if the cultures of imperialism persist 
into the presumed postcolonial era, new and different sorts of knowledge must be created to help 
decolonize consciousness. And this is what the overarching goal of postcolonial studies is: it grapples 
with colonialism’s legacies and seeks alternative representations or knowledge that do not fall prey to 
colonialist knowledge’s misrepresentations and epistemic violence. That’s why it’s labeled post-colonial 
theory: it is not ‘post-colonial’ in the sense of referring to a historical moment after decolonization. 
Rather, it is ‘post-colonial’ in the sense of “decolonial”: it seeks theories, ways of representing the 
world, and narratives that escape the confines of the imperial episteme and can generate new 
knowledge that casts off the epistemic legacies of empire.  
This is exactly why postcolonial theory is helpful for us as sociologists. While sociology was born 
from and operated within the culture of empire, postcolonial theory was born from the imperial mar-
gins, from the colonies and subjugated areas of empire. While sociology has been part and parcel of 
the imperial episteme, representing the imperial standpoint; postcolonial theory seeks to go beyond 
that episteme and beyond that standpoint. Postcolonial theory then, can help us sociologists take 
empire seriously and perhaps offer ways for sociology to go beyond its own imperial origins. 
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Lessons of Postcolonial Theory 
But let me be more precise; what exactly what might we take from postcolonial theory? In short, post-
colonial theory invites us to make two moves: 
The first is self-critique. I mentioned already that sociology was initially born within the culture of 
empire. But what postcolonial theory can help us see is how sociology today still manifests some of 
those legacies of empire. Now, I am not meaning to say that postcolonial theory can help us criticize 
sociology for being racist. That‘s not the issue. It’s rather than postcolonial theory can help identify 
certain analytic tendencies in sociology that bear the imprint of the imperial episteme; it can help us 
better see the legacies of empire upon social theory.  
For example, one of the problematic analytic tendencies that postcolonial theory would alert us to 
is sociology’s Orientalism. Classic thinkers like Weber and Durkheim portrayed non-Western societies 
as homogeneous essences, as static and backwards, thereby reserving dynamism, social creativity and 
energy and enlightenment for European societies alone. It is telling that the most common term We-
ber used to describe India is “absence.” These are exactly the sorts of categories and classificatory 
schemes that postcolonial scholars like Edward Said located as part of the imperial episteme. They 
mark a will to essentialize that is exactly the will of imperial power, and it persists in various forms 
today, from Neo-Weberian studies that presume homogenous religious or national cultures to certain 
global sociologies that attempt to divide up the world into distinct “civilizations” that are presumably 
pristine and homogenous and essential. 
A second problematic analytic tendency is the occlusion of colonial or subaltern agency. By this I 
mean the Eurocentric assumption that only the activities of metropolitan actors matter, and the asso-
ciated treatment of colonized or postcolonial peoples as passive receptors of modernity; as subjects 
rather than as agents. When we talk about the origins of capitalism, for instance, we refer to Weber 
and talk about the discipline imposed by the Protestant ethic. We less often refer to the discipline of 
the slaves on Caribbean plantations that helped spawn capitalism. When we talk about the origins of 
liberal modernity, we refer to the French revolutionaries in Paris, not the Haitian revolutionaries who 
are the true originators of the modern notion of human rights. We could proliferate examples; all of 
which would point to the fact that this analytic treatment of peoples as subjects rather than actors 
merely reproduces how imperialists themselves saw colonized peoples. It enacts in our theory how 
empires treated colonized peoples in actual practice.  
A third legacy of the imperial episteme is what I would call “analytic bifurcation.” By this I mean the 
analytic abstraction or separation of social objects from their wider constitutive relations, creating a 
false separation. This is what Edward Said might call the “law of division” which is inscribed in the im-
perial episteme. It is an artificial separation between metropole and colony, between the so-called 
“West” and “the East”; of “Europe” from “non-Europe” – and variants thereof, such the bifurcation be-
tween the “inside” of nations versus the “outside” of nations; or “the domestic” from the “foreign.” 
When Durkheim, for instance, famously theorizes societies based upon organic solidarity – by which 
he meant modern western societies – and when he differentiated them from societies based upon 
mechanical solidarity – by which he meant so-called “primitive societies”, he analytically bifurcates 
these societies. He treats them as completely separate and autonomous from each other. The prob-
lem is that in reality no such separate societies existed. Precisely at the time Durkheim was writing, 
European societies of organic solidarity were able to have that form of organic solidarity because of 
colonialism; that is, because they were ruling societies based upon mechanical solidarity. In fact, in 
many cases, European imperial societies were deliberately maintaining tribal social structures for the 
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purposes of colonial rule, trying to create mechanical solidarity. So these societies were always inti-
mately connected, and yet Durkheim’s very theory of solidarity disconnects them analytically, thereby 
presuming them to be separate and autonomous societies with their own internal logics. This too, 
postcolonial theorists would point out, is a legacy of the imperial episteme – it reflects the viewpoint of 
European empires that valorized their own agency and autonomy and failed to recognize their de-
pendence upon colonized peoples.  
Fourth and finally, I think postcolonial theory would help critique sociology’s Eurocentric universal-
ism, or what I would also call “metrocentrism.” This is the tendency to transpose provincial categories 
from one site to another, under the assumption of their universality. Fanon (1967 [1952], p.151), for 
example, famously criticized the use of psychoanalysis by French doctors to treat Algerians during 
colonialism. Why, he opined, should we assume that a theory that embedded the specific experiences 
and concerns of the white upper middle class in Austria has anything to say about the experience and 
hence the psyche of black Algerian peasants subjected to French colonial violence?  
Fanon here was pointing out the metrocentric assumptions of French psychiatry, and much of so-
ciology operates the same way. We all know that sociology’s early theories posited a presumably uni-
versal template of development based upon Europe’s experience and then applied it to the rest of the 
world. Theories about rationalization or “organic solidarity” or modernization theory, theories about 
society as an integrated, cohesive “system” from Parsons or Luhmann, the wage relation between 
white worker and white employer in Marx’s theory – all of these were based upon the singular experi-
ence and empirics of Anglo-European societies, but we then apply them to all other societies unprob-
lematically, reducing spatial or geographical or cultural difference to temporal difference and all the 
while presuming the analytic primacy of the Anglo-European experience.  
Raewyn Connell’s (2007, p.vii–viii) critique of “Northern” theory is appropriate here. Connell argues 
that sociology is “Northern” in that it “embeds the viewpoints, perspectives and problems of metropol-
itan society, while presenting itself as universal knowledge.” In other words, we take a very specific and 
arguably limited parochial experience – that of European societies – and universalize that to the entire 
world. And in so doing, we fail to recognize the situatedness and hence the provinciality of these theo-
ries. For, after all, these theories do not come from nowhere. They are not universal. They emerge 
from particular times and places by social actors shaped by the social context of their thought. Yet, by 
metrocentrism, we assume universality. By metrocentrism, we try to pull the “god trick”, presuming a 
view from nowhere when it in fact the view is from somewhere, from a particular location, and driven 
by particular interests: in this case, from the imperial center. Again, this is a legacy of the imperial epis-
teme structuring contemporary sociological logic. Just as imperialists treated the world as an empty 
space that they could colonize in their own image, so does metrocentric sociology treat the world as a 
blank canvas upon which it paints its Eurocentric theories.  
To be clear, the problem is not that metrocentrism is politically incorrect. The problem is that it is 
unscientific. Sociologists always complain about generalizability. But northern theory is everything but 
generalizable. The United States and Europe together make up a small percentage of the world’s pop-
ulation, yet we model our theories upon that tiny percentage. In this light, those who might claim that 
sociology is a highly provincial and narrow science can be forgiven.  
The same goes for all of the analytic tendencies I’m discussing here. The point is not that Oriental-
ism, the occlusion of agency, analytic bifurcation or metrocentrism are problematic because they are 
politically distasteful or that they reproduce the logic of the imperial episteme. The point is that, be-
cause of this fact, they render sociology analytically limited. They only lead, I would argue, to impover-
ished sociological accounts and explanations; they force us, – simply put – to do bad sociology. Sociol-
ogy can and should do better.  
JUL I AN GO  
8 
Towards a Postcolonial Sociology 
So, given these critiques, the question is: how? How can sociology truly take empire seriously and cast 
off the baggage of its imperial origins?  
Well, first and foremost, it should be clear what I do not believe. And that is the postmodern posi-
tion that some postcolonial scholars in the humanities have adopted. According to this perspective, 
sociology, because of its imperial origins and positivist character, is intrinsically problematic; that it can 
never truly be a critical tool. This is a view that I vehemently reject. Not only is it wrong, it also under-
estimates the fact that postcolonial theory itself depends upon a sort of implicit sociology. So the goal 
should not and cannot be throwing out sociology entirely. The challenge rather is to work within the 
terms of sociology to overcome its limitations. As Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) puts it in a different con-
text: we must recognize both the inadequacy and the indispensability of social science. 
So, the question remains: how might we do a sociology that is attentive to the postcolonial critique? 
For lack of time, I cannot delve into this too much. What I can do here is draw from my book Postcolo-
nial Thought and Social Theory and highlight two approaches for generating new sociologies that do not 
fall prey to the confines of the imperial episteme.  
The first is postcolonial relationalism. By “relationalism”, I'm referring to the social ontology that 
goes back to Ernst Cassier and continues through American sociologists like George Herbert Mead up 
to more recent theories like Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory (see Emirbayer 1997). Relationalism is im-
portant for us here because it exposes the poverty of essentialism. With a relational ontology, social 
entities can only be thought of as constituted by a series of relations external to them and that consti-
tute them as entities in the first place. As such, relationalism aligns with the postcolonial critique of 
Orientalism. By a relational approach, we can no longer essentialize other cultures or societies as stat-
ic and homogeneous. And more importantly, with relationalism we can throw off the imperial epis-
teme’s assumptions of metropolitan agency and its occlusion of colonial agency. By the principles of 
relationalism, Europe’s identity and standing cannot be narrated as the result of European agency and 
autonomy, but rather must be seen as always-already constituted by its relations with others – not 
least those whom Europe had colonized and subjugated. 
 In sum, postcolonial relationalism overcomes analytic bifurcation and what Said (1979) called the 
imperial episteme’s “law of division.” It opens our eyes to how the center is always constituted by the 
periphery, never isolated from it, precisely by its relations with the periphery. And I’m not just talking 
about economic relations. I’m also referring to identities, social forms and social practices of all sorts. 
Postcolonial relationalism invites us to track how, on all of these registers, entities that we had previ-
ously taken to be separate and autonomous are in fact always constituted by their presumed others. It 
would also, by the same token, have us interrogate why and how these entities have taken on the 
appearance of autonomy and essentialism, and it would enable us to see how such an appearance is 
an epistemic effect of the imperial standpoint.  
So that’s one approach. Another is the subaltern standpoint. This approach comes from postcolonial 
theorists but also from work in STS and feminist theory.  
By “subaltern,” I mean a social position of knowing rooted in geopolitical and global social hierar-
chy. It is the position of – and hence embeds – the activities, experiences, concerns and perspectives, 
of globally peripheral (e.g. colonized and postcolonized) populations. This is a geopolitical and social 
position that is constituted historically within broader relations of power. And my proposal is that, by 
starting our sociologies from this position – from this subaltern standpoint – we can ask new ques-
tions, and craft new concepts that escape metrocentrism and the imperial standpoint of conventional 
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social theory. Rather than grounded in the particular concerns, categories and contexts of imperial 
metropoles, a sociology that starts from the subaltern standpoint is grounded in the concerns, catego-
ries and contexts of globally-subjugated groups. Close to what Connell (2007) calls Southern Theory as 
opposed to Northern theory, this approach seeks to replace the imperial episteme with the insight of 
subjugated or repressed knowledges. 
This is exactly how postcolonial thinkers themselves operated. Take the work of Frantz Fanon. Fan-
on was a revolutionary and writer but also was a sort of social theorist, and in fact innovated on many 
fronts. He theorized race in a way that was different from the dominant discourse of the time. Fanon 
claimed that race was not a biological essence but the product of what he called “sociogenesis”; that is, 
it was a social construction and specifically constructed through the colonial relationship. Blackness 
was something constructed by the colonizer – who in turn constituted their own identity in opposition 
(Fanon 1967[1952], p.110).  
But, more than just race, Fanon also offered a new theory of colonialism itself. You have to under-
stand, at the time of his writing, “colonialism” was not a theorized object; at most it was seen in coloni-
al ethnographies or political discourse as a neutral expression of benevolent governance; not an ob-
ject with its own logics. But Fanon innovated. He theorized colonialism as a system in its own right; a 
racialized and intrinsically violent system connected to the wider imperial economy and generating the 
identities of colonizer and colonized alike (Go 2016, pp.166–167). And not only was this a radically new 
theory, positing an entirely new social object that had been more or less ignored in existing social sci-
ence.  
So Fanon’s work was innovative and influential. But this is the question: how did Fanon begin? 
What enabled him to innovate? What was his method? Fanon did not begin by transposing, say, the 
categories of Parsons’ structural functionalism to colonial Algeria; or Luhmann’s system theory; nor 
did he even begin with Marxist categories. Fanon first drew from his own experiences and observa-
tions as a black subject of the French colonial empire; as a young black man from Martinique living in 
France and then as a Martinican working as a psychiatrist in Algeria where he witnessed the violence 
of French colonialism first-hand. Of course, in his writings, Fanon indeed engaged with existing theo-
retical systems. He engaged with Marxist categories as well as those of Freud and Sartre. But he did 
not begin with these categories. He instead started from the standpoint of the racialized colonial sub-
ject: he started with their activities, experiences, and perceptions. Fanon famously starts his book 
Black Skin White Masks with the question: “What does a black man want?” And from that starting point, 
he generated important insights on race and colonialism.  
Fanon is only one example; we could also look to others like W. E. B. Dubois. In his book The Souls of 
Black Folk ([1994]1903) Dubois begins his own novel approach to race relations in the US with a ques-
tion that is not entirely different from Fanon’s: that is, “how does it feel to be a problem?” And Dubois 
too, from that beginning point, articulates his own theory of racial subjugation. 
This is what I mean by a subaltern standpoint approach: the questions asked, the concepts em-
ployed, the theories developed – these are not metrocentrically deduced from dominant theories but 
rather created first from the experiences and concerns of subaltern subjects.  
As I approach a conclusion, let me clarify some things here because this approach can be easily 
misunderstood. First of all, by this approach, I am not saying that sociology is just about reporting on 
the experiences of individual subaltern subjects. I am not saying we look at the experiences and con-
cerns of subaltern groups and that’s the end of it. I am saying that we start from the subaltern stand-
point approach and generate concepts or theories from that perspective. Fanon, for instance, started 
with the experiences of colonized subjects to ask new questions that Marx, Freud or Parsons were not 
asking and from there he built a set of concepts and excavated logics that modeled wider systemic 
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relations and institutions. So this is not just about reporting on individuals’ experiences. It is about cre-
ating sociologies from the ground up. 
Second, by this approach, I am not implying a reverse essentialism. I am not saying that just be-
cause a theorist is from the Global South or is of a particular race that they necessarily offer better 
knowledge. I am referring to a social position in a hierarchy that is the starting point for analysis. I am 
not referring to an essential identity. And it’s a social position that anyone, regardless of their identity, 
can access if done properly. So this is not about just trying to find thinkers from the Global South and 
automatically assuming that, because of their origin or identity, they offer important insights. This is 
not just about looking for these theories from the Global South and “adding to the canon.” In other 
words, it is not about whether the sociologist or theorist themselves are subaltern. It’s about whether 
the questions, concepts and theories were generated initially from the subaltern standpoint. 
Finally, by this subaltern standpoint approach, I am not trying to suggest that our sociologies 
should be subjectivist; nor am I insinuating an epistemic relativism. Instead, I am operating from a 
view of knowledge that comes in part from postcolonial theory but also realist philosophies of science 
called “scientific perspectivism” or what I would call “perspectival realism” (Giere 2006; Go 2016a; Go 
2016b). I don't have time to go into this here, but the point is that perspectival realism insists that all 
knowledge is perspectival but still true; that knowledge is always partial and objective at the same 
time.  
A good metaphor for this epistemology has to do with maps (Giere 2006). Maps are like theories in 
that they offer knowledge of a place. A map of London offers knowledge of London. But no map can 
represent all of London. Each map has to be partial, even if can be objectively valid. For instance, a 
map of London’s subway allows us to see the Tube of London. But the map is partial, because it only 
gives one representation of London’s transport system. It does not, for instance, tell us anything about 
London’s streets. To know about streets – i.e. to create a street map – you have to have to walk up-
stairs and start seeing London from the street-level. You have to adopt a different standpoint; you have 
to see London from a different perspective. And in turn, the map of London’s streets is also partial yet 
objective: it tells us about the streets but not about the subway or about, say, the water or sewage 
lines. For a map of those things you have to adopt a different standpoint.  
So our sociological theories are the same: they are each like maps. They come from certain stand-
points and offer us some knowledge but always partial knowledge. And taking empire seriously – and 
thus taking postcolonial theory seriously – means that we can recognize that the problem with much 
of sociology is that it has offered us only limited kinds of maps: maps that come from the imperial 
episteme, maps that reflect the standpoint of imperial metropoles – while nonetheless insisting that 
those maps are universal; that those maps are the only maps that matters.  
A subaltern standpoint approach might help us overcome this limitation. Starting our sociologies 
from the subaltern standpoint is one way to overcome the hubris of sociology’s imperial standpoint 
and generate new knowledge that escapes the limitations and legacies of empire. 
And to conclude, I’d say that this is exactly what we need today. All of our countries continue to 
grapple with the legacies of empire, colonialism and slavery: from persistent racism in the face of im-
migration – racism that draws upon colonial discourses – to continued inequality between the Global 
North and Global South, to the persistence of the imperial episteme in our social sciences. Given all of 
this, we need to take empire seriously; and doing so means we need new programs, questions, con-
cepts and theories. We need new maps – new maps to better understand, and confront, the dilemmas 
of our ex-colonial world in which the legacies of empire persist.  
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